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14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
15 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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18 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
19 Plaintiff,
20 v.
21 SHERRY RENEE KINCADE,
22 Defendant.

23 CASE NO. 1:21-MJ-00057-SAB
24 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
25 TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
FINDINGS AND ORDER
DATE: June 23, 2021
TIME: 2:00 p.m.
COURT: Hon. Stanley A. Boone

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27
28 **BACKGROUND**

29 This case is set for status conference on June 23, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued
30 General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further
31 notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue matters,
32 excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued
33 on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.”
34 General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case
35 exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the request of
36 counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will
37 impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and previous
38 General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

39 Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has

1 emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive
 2 openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.
 3 *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no
 4 exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at
 5 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
 6 judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally
 7 or in writing").

8 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory
 9 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-
 10 justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
 11 findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and
 12 the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable
 13 unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that
 14 the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public
 15 and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id.*

16 The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code
 17 T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics,
 18 natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such
 19 circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance
 20 following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court
 21 recognized that the eruption created "appreciable difficulty" for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-69; *see*
 22 *also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time
 23 following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).

24 The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, "appreciable difficulty" to the prompt
 25 proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a "non-
 26 exhaustive" list of seven factors it found to be "relevant" in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act
 27 continuances "in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic." *United States v. Olsen*, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL
 28 1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is

1 detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked
2 speedy trial rights since the case's inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a
3 population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness
4 of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes;
5 (6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed;
6 and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. *Id.*

7 In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding
8 excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7)
9 (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. *United*
10 *States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be
11 "specifically limited in time").

12 STIPULATION

13 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and
14 through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

15 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on June 23, 2021.

16 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 14,
17 2021, and to exclude time between June 23, 2021, and July 14, 2021, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E)
18 and (7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4].

19 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

20 a) This matter concerns an out-of-district indictment from the Eastern District of
21 Virginia. The government has indicated that it would be amenable to a Rule 20 transfer from the
22 Eastern District of Virginia to the Eastern District of California.

23 b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, review
24 the current charges, and to discuss a potential Rule 20 transfer of this case from the Eastern
25 District of Virginia to the Eastern District of California.

26 c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested
27 continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking
28 into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because the defendant is not currently detained and has not invoked her speedy trial rights. Additionally, any trial in this matter will require witnesses to travel from out of state to the Eastern District of California.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 23, 2021 to July 14, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E) and (7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 16, 2021

PHILLIP A. TALBERT
Acting United States Attorney

Dated: June 16, 2021

/s/ **MEGHAN MCLOUGHLIN**
MEGHAN MCLOUGHLIN
Counsel for Defendant
SHERRY RENEE KINCADE

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 17, 2021



UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE